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Making Psychology Relevant 
ABSTRACT 
This paper describes some key features of a discursive psychological approach.  In 
particular, discursive psychology is analytically focused on the way psychological 
phenomena are practical, accountable, situated, embodied and displayed.  It describes its 
particular version of constructionism and its distinctive approach to cognition as points of 
contrast with a range of other perspectives, including critical discourse analysis, 
sociolinguistics, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis.  Finally, it describes three 
areas where discursive psychology is involved with social critique: work on categories and 
prejudice; issues to do with cognitivism and its problems; and work developing a discursive 
psychology of institutions. 
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Making Psychology Relevant 
This is the first time that Discourse & Society has devoted a special issue entirely to 
papers that come out of the emerging discipline of discursive psychology.  In this paper I will 
try briefly to set out what is distinctive about discursive psychology in relation to the broader 
interdisciplary field of discourse studies and some of the ways it contributes to critical social 
analysis.  This will inevitably be schematic and contentious, but is intended to supplement the 
depth of the papers that came before.  
1. What is discursive psychology? 
One way of characterising discursive psychology is as an approach that that treats 
psychology as an object in and for interaction.  It is specifically called discursive psychology, 
then, as psychology is understood as part of discourse, as a feature of practices in a range of 
settings.   The difference from traditional psychological perspectives is stark.  Traditional 
psychological perspectives focus on giving a technical account of the actual psychological 
states, processes and entities that underpin (and thereby partly explain) action.  Discursive 
psychology (DP) focuses on psychology from the position of participants – it considers their 
practical and situated constructions, terms, orientations, and displays.  Using the classic 
linguistic distinction, DP considers psychology in fundamentally emic terms, eschewing the 
etic perspective that is standard in cognitivist and social cognitivist psychology.  From its 
perspective the traditional objects and distinctions of cognitivist psychology start to lose 
sense and a radically different terrain of psychology comes into view.  What sustains the 
coherence of the enterprise of discursive psychology is not the idea of a mental space to be 
populated by expert research but the massive significance of psychological constructions and 
notions in human affairs.   
 2 
Insofar as psychology is an object in discursive psychology it is practical, 
accountable, situated, embodied and displayed.  Let me take these elements in turn.  In DP 
psychology is… 
…PRACTICAL 
Psychology in DP is first and foremost something practical.  Psychology in this sense 
is bound up with peoples’ practices.  Descriptions (of psychological, material or social 
objects) can be studied for the way they are invoked in activities such as blaming, 
complementing, inviting and so on (Potter, 1996).  The psychological categories that make up 
the mental thesaurus can be studied as a kitbag of resources for doing things.  For example, 
not remembering can be a resource for building or resisting an accusation (Lynch & Bogen, 
2005); a construction of ‘boiling anger’ can be used to establish the extremity and 
inappropriate nature of provocation (Edwards, 1997); the moderators use of a ‘belief’ 
construction in a focus group questions can encourage quick answers and discourage 
accounts and ‘don’t know’ responses (Puchta & Potter, 2004).  This practical focus is a 
contrast to the more traditional psychological focus on perception, information processing 
and understanding.  This practical focus is one major reason for DP research to have moved 
away from the analysis of open-ended interviews and on to the analysis of situated interaction 
recorded in natural settings.  
…ACCOUNTABLE 
A major element of the way psychology is woven into everyday practices is through 
the focus on accountability.  How are individuals (or collectivities, organizations, or intra-
individual entities) constructed as sites of responsibility?  The focus on accountability 
typically works on two levels at once.  First, there is speaker’s construction of agency and 
accountability in the reported events (who or what should be blamed, complimented, and so 
on).  Second, there is the speaker’s construction of their own agency and accountability, 
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including what they are doing through speaking.  Often these two levels of accountability are 
closely bound together such that speakers can construct their own accountability via the 
construction of others’ and vice versa (Edwards & Potter, 1992).  For example, Locke and 
Edwards (2003) studied the way President Clinton’s constructions of Monica Lewinsky’s 
actions, emotions and motivations were reflexively and constructively linked to his own 
accountability. 
…SITUATED 
In DP psychology is situated in three senses.  First, psychological concerns, 
orientations and categories are studied as embedded in interaction.  Such an analysis draws 
on the methods and findings of conversation analysis.  For example, take the traditional social 
psychological category of ‘attitude’ – a relatively enduring mentally encoded construct.  DP 
radically reworks the notion of attitudes by focusing on situated evaluations (Potter, 1998; 
Wiggins & Potter, 2003), drawing on Pomerantz’ (1984) foundational work on assessments 
in talk.  Second, psychological concerns, orientations and categories can be rhetorically 
oriented.  For example, the construction of a particular evaluation (of the British royal family, 
in an argument, say) may be built to counter an alternative (Billig, 1996).  Third, 
psychological concerns, orientations and categories are situated institutionally, in the 
practices of relationship counselling talk, family chat, courtroom summaries and so on.  The 
primary analytic focus for analysing this third sense of situation is how psychological matters 
are introduced, constructed and made relevant to the setting’s business (Edwards & Potter, 
2001).   
…EMBODIED 
DP focuses on discourse.  As a perspective it holds back from what might 
superficially appear to be the direct study of embodiment (as seen in parts of experimental 
social cognition, for example, or in some traditions of the sociology of the body, or in some 
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ethnographies).  The reason for this is that such an approach dislocates embodiment from 
participants’ own constructions and orientations.  Instead in DP embodiment comes in 
through analysis of situated constructions of the body (as in Hepburn & Wiggins, 2005, this 
volume), through the procedural unfolding of talk (as in Wiggins, 2002), or through video 
analysis of embodied interaction that, crucially, treats orientations and constructions as a 
primary analytic resources (as in Heath et al., 1999).   
…DISPLAYED 
For a range of conceptual, theoretical and analytic reasons DP rejects the John Locke 
picture of an inner, private psychology for which language serves as the conduit for 
transporting thoughts between minds.  This is what Harris (1988) calls the telementation view 
of language.  In its place DP focuses on psychology as something displayed in talk and 
interaction.  DP here is building on Wittgenstein’s (1953) critique of the idea of a private 
language, Coulter’s (1990) sociology of mind and, most fundamentally, Sacks’ (1992) project 
for understanding interaction that emphasised that language must be understandable and 
learnable.  From Sacks’ perspective mind, intentions, understanding and so on are part of 
interaction through their current hearability in the interaction itself.  Rather than seeing such 
things as lying behind the talk they are seen as features visible in the talk itself.  It radically 
counters the traditional psychological dualism of inner and outer.  For example, the important 
cognitive psychological idea of shared understanding has been understood in terms of 
displays involving collaborative sentence production (Sacks, 1992), in terms of the 
procedural role of the turn and repair organization of talk (Schegloff, 1992), and in terms of 
how the basis for ongoing interaction is constructed in talk (Edwards, 1999).  These traditions 
are discussed in detail in Potter and te Molder (2005). 
DP is not an alternative analytic approach to the topic of cognition.  It is a 
thoroughgoing respecification of cognition in particular and psychology more generally.  The 
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centrepiece of this respecification is DP’s emphasis on psychology’s practical and 
interactional role and the associated methodological move to focusing on the analysis of 
naturalistic discourse in everyday and institutional settings.   
2. Discursive Psychology and the field of Discourse Studies 
The thoroughgoing respecification of the psychological in DP puts it at odds 
analytically with alternative perspectives in discourse studies (some strands of 
sociolinguistics, some kinds of discourse process work, some styles of critical discourse 
analysis) that link studies of interaction to psychological processes or representations.  See, 
for example, Edwards & Potter (1993) on discourse processes work; Potter (1996) on critical 
discourse analysis, and Potter & Edwards (2001) on sociolinguistics.   An important part of 
the contrast with these approaches comes from the aim in DP to work with a consistent 
constructionist perspective that recognizes the contingency of descriptions and their 
involvement with practices.  It is this consistent constructionism that provides part of the 
distinctive take on issues of ‘psychology’ as well as a range of topics such as ‘context’, 
‘material objects’, ‘embodiment’.   
Constructionism is one of the things that sets DP apart from some strands of 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis.  However, the contrast is a complex one.  
There are, of course, differences between ‘classic’ ethnomethodology and Garfinkel’s more 
recent programme, and between Sacks’ earlier interest in membership categorization and the 
broader conversation analytic tradition he founded.  This makes any simple comparison with 
DP difficult.  Moreover, the constructionism in DP is itself a rather specific tradition.  It 
developed out of problematics in sociology of scientific knowledge (Ashmore, 1989) focused 
on the constructive role of descriptions and versions.  This sets it apart from the 
phenomenological social constructionism of Berger and Luckmann (1966).  Indeed, Berger 
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and Luckmann offer more of a cognitivist position in their focus is on the construction of an 
individual’s experience.  They do not consider how constructions (in talk and texts, in 
settings) of that ‘experience’ are used to do things, which would be a more DP project.  
Within ethnomethodology there is a long tradition of considering fact construction (most 
notably in the studies collected in Smith, 1990) and Sacks’ earliest work was focused on the 
topic of description (Sacks, 1963).  Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998) provide an account what a 
conversation analytic approach to fact construction might look like.  Nevertheless, some 
ethnomethodologists argue strongly against constructionist positions (Button & Sharrock, 
1993). 
Another potential difference arises in the theorizing of cognition.  DP is not a 
cognitivist perspective.  That is, it is not an attempt to explain actions by reference to 
underlying cognitive states or processes.  However, the concepts, entities and distinctions of 
cognition are a major topic on two levels.  First, studies consider the wide range of ways that 
cognitive language is used in settings such as neighbour disputes or child protection calls 
(Stokoe & Hepburn, 2005; Hepburn & Wiggins, 2005, this volume).  Second, studies 
consider ways in which psychological methods and instruments reproduce cognitivism by 
failing to analytically encompass the way cognitive talk is oriented to action (see, for 
example, Antaki, 2004, and Auburn, 2005, this volume).  Discourse workers have also 
developed different ways of engaging with, and reconsidering issues of psychodynamics and 
the unconscious (Billig, 1999; Wetherell, 2003). 
This focus on cognitive concepts and distinctions in practice is distinct from some 
approaches from ethnomethodology and conceptual analysis.  For example, Coulter (1999) 
has criticized DP for taking an empirical and discourse analytic rather than an apriori 
approach, and for not offering a corrective to mistaken cognitive constructions whether in 
academic, institutional or everyday settings.  DP researchers have argued that the indexical 
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and rhetorically oriented features of cognitive constructions means that conceptual analysis, 
while important, is not sufficient for analytic work (Edwards & Potter, 2005; Potter & 
Edwards, 2003).  When people talk on the proposed and oriented-to basis that their words 
express inner thoughts and feelings, in counselling say, this is an analytic topic for DP rather 
than something to be corrected.  Nevertheless, DP is much closer to some other strands in 
ethnomethodological work addressed to, and respecifying, cognition such as Lynch & Bogen 
(2005). 
The relationship with conversation analysis is equally complex.  One way of 
understanding conversation analysis is as providing a consistently non-cognitive analytic 
perspective that is concerned with the mind in terms of formulations and displays embedded 
in the turn and sequence organization of conversation.  Sacks’ very first published lecture 
advocates the analysis of interaction independently of any concerns about the cognitive basis 
of what might be going on (1992, p. 11).  For the most part conversation analysts have not 
been focused on issues of mind cognition.  Yet where they have addressed such issues there 
has been some ambivalence over the role of cognitive processes.  For example, in recent 
discussions Drew (2005), Heritage (2005) and Pomerantz (2005) in different ways attempt to 
link interactional phenomena to underlying cognitive states rather than following a DP 
approach of understanding putatively cognitive phenomena in interactional terms. 
3. Discursive Psychology and Critique 
This short article will end with some brief observations about the status of critique in 
discursive psychology, highlighting its enduring interest in a cluster of issues to do with 
categories and prejudice, its debates with traditional cognitivist approaches to psychology, 
and its interest in psychology and institutions. 
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CATEGORIES AND PREJUDICE 
One of the first critical themes in the style of discourse analysis that evolved into 
discursive psychology was focused on issues to do with racism, prejudice and minority 
groups (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Wetherell, et al., 1987).  Much 
of this early work used open-ended interviews with the aim of identifying interpretative 
repertoires and practices.  The current collection shows two kinds of evolution in this work.  
First, Tileagă (2005, this volume) has worked primarily with open-ended interviews in his 
analysis of the management of producing extreme accounts against Romanies.  A feature of 
his study is its careful, conversation analytically informed, analysis of the interview talk (cf. 
Edwards, 2003).  It avoids a number of the difficulties that have been highlighted in recent 
qualitative work using open-ended interviews (Potter & Hepburn, 2005).  Second, Eriksson 
and Aronsson (2005, this volume) and Sneijder and te Molder (2005, this volume) illustrate 
the way that categories and issues to do with prejudice can be studied through studying 
natural settings where such things come up and are managed.     
CRITIQUES OF COGNITIVISM 
All of the papers in this special issue show the continuing development of a non-
cognitivist approach to psychological matters.  They do this in different ways.  For example, 
Stokoe and Hepburn (2005, this volume) consider material where noise is reported.  
However, their analysis is worlds apart from the traditional cognitive psychology of noise 
that is focused on perception, thresholds and so on.  Instead, they analyse the way noise is 
worked up in descriptions to provide legitimate concern for complaint.  Auburn (2005, this 
volume) takes as its topic the way that semi-technical cognitive notions become bound up 
with the practices of participants. 
 9 
PSYCHOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONS 
Most of the papers here show the value of working with materials collected from 
institutional settings.  This allows researchers to address the way particular psychological (or 
‘psychological’) terms and orientations have institutional roles in particular settings.  This is a 
rather different approach to social organization than most late C20th social psychology, 
which aimed to identify the operation of generic social processes, independently of 
institutions or historical settings (Gergen, 1982).  One of the aims of DP is to show the way 
institutions such as therapy, education, focus groups, court cases are characterised by specific 
‘psychological business’.  Moreover, analyses of this kind can explicate both the specifics of 
the psychological business and the nature of the institution.  For example, Stokoe and 
Hepburn’s (2005, this volume) article on noise reports in NSPCC and neighbour mediation 
provides a way of explicating subtle differences in the considerations underlying interaction 
in these different institutions. 
These are only some of the critical themes that can be illuminated by DP; Hepburn 
(2003) and Speer (2005) review further strands of work. 
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